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Performativity and the “True/False Fetish”  
 
SAVAS L. TSOHATZIDIS 
 
If you hurl a tomato at a political meeting (or bawl “I protest” when 
someone else does–if that is performing an action) the consequence 
will probably be to make others aware that you object …: but this will 
not make either the throw or the shout true or false (though they may 
be, even deliberately, misleading). 
Austin, How to Do Things with Words 
 
Introduction  
J. L. Austin took it to be a defining feature of the sorts of utterances that he 
came to call “explicit performative utterances” that they are neither true nor 
false, despite being utterances of declarative sentences, which are 
traditionally regarded as paradigms of truth-evaluability; and he did not feel 
compelled to give arguments for his non-truth-evaluability thesis, pointing 
out that he considers it to be too obvious to require defence.  Wedded as 
they have been to a truth-conditional conception of linguistic content, 
subsequent philosophers of language have refused to accept Austin’s non-
truth-evaluability thesis –not surprisingly, since maintaining both it and the 
truth-conditional conception of content would force them to conclude that 
explicit performative utterances have no content at all. And since those 
philosophers, along with everyone else, do acknowledge both the 
contentfulness of explicit performatives and the significance of the 
phenomenon of  performativity to which Austin was the first to pay 
systematic attention, they have sought to explain what is special about 
explicit performatives by devising accounts of them that not only do not 
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incorporate Austin’s non-truth-evaluability thesis but positively require 
precisely what Austin was ruling out –accounts, that is, according to which 
what is distinctive about explicit performatives cannot be understood unless 
they are taken to be bearers of a truth value.    
 The belief that such accounts are reliable, together with the absence 
of arguments on Austin’s part, appears to be the main reason why Austin’s 
thesis that explicit performatives are truth-valueless “is denied by almost 
everyone nowadays,” as Hornsby (2006: 904) notes in an overview of post-
Austinian work on performativity. But that denial would be apt for 
reconsideration, if it could be shown that anti-Austinian explanations of 
explicit performativity face insuperable problems that are due precisely to 
their assumption that explicit performatives are truth evaluable. This essay 
proposes to make a step towards such reconsideration. After a reminder of 
some characteristics of explicit performatives that are acknowledged by all 
parties to the dispute, I argue that attempts to justify the denial of Austin’s 
non-truth evaluability thesis by producing explanations of performativity 
that essentially depend on the hypothesis that explicit performatives are 
truth-evaluable cannot succeed for at least two types of reason:  on the one 
hand, because utterances that, on the proposed explanations, should be 
capable of being explicit performative ones turn out to be incapable of being 
explicit performative ones; on the other hand, because utterances that, on 
the proposed explanations, should be incapable of being explicit 
performative ones turn out to be capable of being explicit performative ones.  
Since the source of these explanatory failures turns out to be none other 
than the adoption of the hypothesis that explicit performatives are truth-
evaluable, I suggest that they strongly undermine the anti-Austinian view 
and vindicate Austin’s thesis, in favour of which I then sketch an 
independent argument based on the behaviour of explicit performatives in 
deductive inferential contexts (specifically, on the fact that their behaviour in 
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such contexts could not be reconciled with the hypothesis that they are 
truth-evaluable unless one denied the applicability, in those contexts, of 
certain logically fundamental inference rules). My conclusion is that the 
Austinian thesis can by no means be regarded as having been superseded, 
and that Austin’s opponents might even have to seriously consider adopting 
it if some of their own broader interests were to be safeguarded.   
 
Performativity and the anti-Austinian view 
The sorts of utterances to which Austin was focusing attention when he 
came to use the label “explicit performative utterances”, and which are 
commonly discussed under that label today, are utterances of grammatically 
declarative sentences each of which is such that  (a) its speaker, referring 
therein to himself/herself in the first person singular, predicates of 
himself/herself an illocutionary act named by a simple present tense, active 
main verb (and its object, if it has one), and (b) its issuance in the right 
circumstances constitutes the performance, by the speaker, of the act that 
he/she thereby predicates of himself/herself.  Thus, an utterance, in the 
right circumstances, of the sentence, “I deny that arithmetic is complete”, 
can constitute a speaker’s denial that arithmetic is complete, and so can be 
an explicit performative utterance; whereas an utterance of the sentence, “I 
prove that arithmetic is incomplete”, can under no circumstances constitute 
a speaker’s proof that arithmetic is incomplete, and so cannot be an explicit 
performative utterance.  Similarly, an utterance, in the right circumstances, 
of the sentence, “I recommend the Hammerklavier sonata” can constitute a 
speaker’s recommendation, to some hearer or hearers, and for some 
purpose or purposes, of the Hammerklavier sonata, and so can be an explicit 
performative utterance; whereas an utterance of the sentence, “I perform 
the Hammerklavier sonata”, can under no circumstances constitute anyone’s 
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performance of the Hammerklavier sonata, and, therefore, cannot be an 
explicit performative utterance.   
 Two constraints on explicit performativity, both of them noted by 
Austin, are generally acknowledged and would be worth keeping in mind in 
the present context. The first is that a declarative sentence otherwise 
conforming to the type of declarative sentence described above is not, in 
general, performatively usable —i.e., usable in such a way that its production 
by its speaker can constitute the performance, by that speaker, of the act 
named by its active main verb—, if its active main verb occurs in a 
grammatical person other than the first person or in a grammatical tense 
other than the (usually, simple) present tense:  Although “I request your 
support” can constitute my request of your support and “I offer you my 
car” can constitute my offer to you of my car (and so, can be explicit 
performative utterances), neither “I requested your support” nor “I offered 
you my car” can constitute my request of your support or my offer to you 
of my car, and so cannot be explicit performative utterances. Furthermore, 
although my saying to you “I request your support” can constitute my 
request of your support, and my saying  to you “I offer you my car” can 
constitute my offer to you of my car, it is not the case that your saying to me 
“You request my support” can constitute my request of your support, or that 
your saying to me  “You offer me your car” can constitute my offer to you of 
my car, which means that neither of these latter utterances can be an explicit 
performative utterance. 
 The second constraint on explicit performativity is that, even when a 
sentence fully conforms, as regards the grammatical features of its main 
verb, to the type of declarative sentence described above, it is, in general, 
only some, and not all, interpretations of those grammatical features that are 
compatible with the sentence’s explicit performative use. In particular, if the 
present tense of the sentence’s main verb is interpreted in a way that allows 
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utterance-time and reference-time to diverge, the sentence cannot normally 
be used performatively. Thus, “I promise never to lie again” can constitute 
my promise never to lie again (and so, can be an explicit performative 
utterance), if the present tense of its main verb is understood as referring 
strictly to the time of speaking (as it would normally be, if the utterance was, 
for example, my response to your utterance of the imperative, “Promise me 
never to lie again!”).  But it cannot constitute my promise never to lie again, 
if, in uttering it, I am simply explaining to you what I do whenever I am 
caught lying (as in,  “Each time I am caught lying, I promise never to lie 
again”);  or if, in uttering it,  I am simply describing to you the commitments 
I have undertaken in a letter that I have posted earlier today (as in, “In the 
final paragraph of the letter I have posted earlier today, I promise never to 
lie again”); or if, in uttering it, I am simply rehearsing what I plan to do in an 
upcoming important meeting (“Here is my plan for tonight’s meeting: First, 
I thank them for accepting to see us. Second, I apologise for having lied 
yesterday. Third, I promise never to lie again.”)  It is, in short, only on 
specific interpretations of its grammatical features –and, in particular, on the 
(relatively uncommon) interpretation of the present tense as referring strictly 
to the time of speaking– that an utterance of a declarative sentence of the 
sort described above can normally be an explicit performative utterance. 
 Austin called “explicit performative verbs”, or simply “performative 
verbs”, the verbs that, under the constraints just noted, can be used as the 
main verbs of explicit performative utterances. And, in moving from the 
exposition of his doctrine of explicit performative utterances to the 
exposition of his doctrine of illocutionary acts, he suggested (1975: 149-150) 
that, if one wants  to obtain a minimally comprehensive list of the types of 
illocutionary act that are commonly recognized in a language, there is no 
better method than to compile (as he himself had set out to do for that 
purpose) a list of the explicit performative verbs of that language –that is, a 
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list of those verbs that can be used as the main verbs of explicit 
performative utterances whose issuance in appropriate circumstances would 
constitute the acts that the verbs name1. 
Apart from their use in providing him with what he regarded as an 
appropriate point of entry into his nascent theory of illocutionary acts, the 
main use that Austin has made of explicit performative utterances (and the 
one that is our primary concern here) was a polemical one.  For, Austin took 
it to be a defining feature of explicit performative utterances not only (i) that 
their speakers, by issuing them in appropriate circumstances, accomplish the 
illocutionary acts that they thereby predicate of themselves,  but also (ii) 
that, in predicating those acts of themselves, they do not produce, nor do 
they intend to produce, a truth-evaluable representation of themselves as 
accomplishing the acts in question (and so, cannot be supposed to be 
accomplishing them by way of describing themselves as accomplishing 
them, or by way of stating that they are accomplishing them, or by way of 
                                                 
1 In expounding his doctrine of illocutionary acts, Austin occasionally used the term 
“performative” not merely as a shorthand for “explicit performative”, but also in a 
different, extended, sense, in which it refers to any utterance accomplishing some speech 
act or other, whether or not the utterance names  (in the way  his “explicit performative 
utterances” do) the act it accomplishes.  Coupled with Austin’s thesis that every natural 
language utterance normally accomplishes some speech act or other, this terminological 
choice has the unfortunate consequence that every normal natural language utterance is 
“performative” in the extended sense, and thus deprives the notion of performativity in 
the extended sense of any clearly distinctive theoretical role. In this essay I use 
“performative” only as a shorthand for Austin’s “explicit performative” –that is, only by 
reference to utterances that name (in their first-person present-tense active main verbs) 
the illocutionary acts they accomplish–, and not in Austin’s inflationary extended sense; 
similarly for “performativity”.  
It seems that Austin became aware of the problem created by his occasional use 
of “performative” in the extended sense when it was too late for him to correct it: the 
editors of How to Do Things with Words tell us in their Appendix that, at the point in 
Austin’s lecture notes where the transition to the doctrine of illocutionary acts (and to 
the inflationary use of “performative”) is effected, there is “a marginal note dated 1958” 
in which Austin writes, “All this isn’t clear!” and asks rhetorically, “Won’t all utterances 
be performative?”  (Austin 1975: 167).  Unlike Austin, some of his commentators, and all 
of his popularizers, appear not to realize that the use of “performative” in the extended 
sense risks trivializing the notion of performativity; what is worse, they sometimes 
advance arguments where conclusions about performativity in the strict sense (that is, 
explicit performativity) are fallaciously drawn from premises concerning performativity in 
the extended sense, or conversely.  
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declaring that they are accomplishing them, or by any other way that would 
require of them to be producing, in accomplishing them, a truth-evaluable 
representation of themselves as accomplishing them).  However, explicit 
performative utterances are utterances of grammatically declarative 
sentences; and since, on the view that was prevalent in the philosophy of 
Austin’s time, utterances of grammatically declarative sentences (if such 
sentences did not belong to those that were condemned as nonsensical for 
positivistic reasons) were assumed to be, and to be intended to be, truth-
evaluable representations of reality, the existence of explicit performative 
utterances constituted, for Austin, a distinctive and decisive type of evidence 
against the aforementioned assumption, which he dubbed “the descriptive 
fallacy” and against which he has found additional occasions to position 
himself in his work2.   
 Post-Austinian philosophers of language are, if anything, even more 
unwilling than some of Austin’s own contemporaries might have been to 
                                                 
2 Austin’s non-truth evaluability thesis regarding explicit performatives is asserted in all 
three of his extended treatments of them that have followed his brief, incidental, 
discussion of the topic in his 1946 article “Other Minds”: the 1955 Harvard  lectures 
posthumously published as How to Do Things with Words (Austin 1975),  the 1956 BBC 
talk posthumously published as “Performative Utterances” (Austin 1979: 233-252), and 
the 1958 Royaumont Abbey talk posthumously published as “Performatif-Constatif” and 
translated as “Performative-Constative” (Austin 1963).  On all three of these occasions, 
the non-truth-evaluability of explicit performatives is presented as evidence against what 
Austin calls the “descriptive fallacy”, a view that he had already targeted under that name 
in “Other Minds” (1946:174; 1979:103). The non-truth evaluability of explicit 
performatives is also asserted, and presented as evidence against the “descriptive fallacy”, 
in Austin’s 1950 article “Truth”, which mentions other kinds of utterances of declarative 
sentences besides explicit performatives that,  in Austin’s view,  are not truth-evaluable 
despite their declarative grammatical form (1950: 125-127; 1979: 130-132).   
It may be worth noting that Austin’s teacher, H. A. Prichard, in a paper on 
promising written, according to its first editor, circa 1940, and published posthumously 
in 1949 (see now Prichard 2002: 257-265), explicitly associates what Austin was later to 
call explicit performativity with non-truth-evaluability.  Commenting on the promise 
made in uttering “I promise not to reduce the rates”, Prichard writes that “while 
everyone would allow that a promise may be made either in good or in bad faith, no one 
would allow that it could be either true or false”, and adds that “promising resembles 
asking a question or issuing an order in that it consists not in making a statement” 
(Prichard 2002: 258).  
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accept Austin’s claim that explicit performative utterances are truth-
valueless, since most of them have come to subscribe to truth-conditional 
theories of linguistic content; if Austin were right, therefore, their accounts 
of linguistic content should be acknowledged to have the undesirable 
consequence that they constrain them to claim, about certain obviously 
contentful utterances of natural language sentences, that they have no 
content at all.  On the other hand, post-Austinian philosophers of language 
would have even less an excuse than Austin’s contemporaries might have to 
claim that the truth-evaluability, and hence (for them) the contentfulness, of 
explicit performatives simply follows from their declarative grammatical form,  
since that claim, besides begging the question against Austin, would beg the 
question against grammatical theory itself: whatever else a grammar of a 
natural language is, it is nowadays widely agreed that it is not something that 
is capable of delivering verdicts as to which linguistic objects are truth-
evaluable and which aren’t. It is therefore not surprising that those post-
Austinian philosophers of language who have attempted to seriously address 
the issue raised by Austin should have sought to resist his non-truth-
evaluability claim about explicit performatives in a way that, at least in 
appearance, neither begs the question against Austin nor makes gratuitous 
assumptions about imaginary pronouncements of grammatical theory.  And 
the way that most of them have found to be adequate to that task can best 
be represented as a kind of abductive argument in favour of the denial of 
Austin’s claim –an argument, specifically, that purports to justify the 
hypothesis that explicit performatives are truth evaluable by claiming that, if 
one assumes, contra Austin, that they are truth evaluable, then one can explain 
the most distinctive feature of explicit performatives that both Austin and 
everyone else acknowledges, namely that their speakers can accomplish, in 
uttering them, the acts that they thereby name. According to the proposed 
explanation, an explicit performative utterance can accomplish, by being 
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issued, the act that it names because it is a truth-evaluable utterance of a 
declarative sentence which, unlike truth-evaluable utterances of other types 
of declarative sentences, has the special property that its truth-condition is 
such that it can be satisfied, thus rendering the utterance true, by the 
utterance’s own issuance. (Thus, what accounts for the fact that an utterance 
like “I deny that arithmetic is complete” can be an explicit performative 
utterance –that is, can constitute a denial that arithmetic is complete– 
whereas an utterance like “I prove that arithmetic is incomplete” cannot be 
an explicit performative utterance –that is, cannot constitute a proof that 
arithmetic is incomplete– is that, although they both are truth-evaluable 
utterances of declarative sentences, the truth condition of the former, unlike 
the truth condition of the latter,  is such that it can be satisfied, thus making 
the utterance true, by the utterance’s own issuance).  And, according to the 
abductive argument that I am here reconstructing, it is precisely because it 
affords this explanation of what explicit performativity really is that the 
hypothesis that explicit performatives are truth evaluable is justified, and can 
be upheld in opposition to Austin’s thesis that they aren’t.  
In a section of his Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century entitled 
“A Lesson about Explicitly Performative Sentences”, Scott Soames 
expresses this currently widespread anti-Austinian understanding of explicit 
performativity in these terms:   
 
[T]he explicitly performative sentence I promise to return the book has a 
straightforwardly descriptive meaning that represents the world as 
being a certain way, and so imposes truth conditions on it. What 
makes this sentence special, and performative, is that one can bring it 
about that these truth conditions are satisfied (i.e., one can bring it 
about that the proposition expressed by the sentence is true) simply 
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by uttering the sentence in the right circumstances. (Soames 2003: 
127) 
 
Soames mentions Lemmon (1962) and Lewis (1979) as exponents of 
versions of this view, but a far more influential twentieth century 
philosopher, Quine, could have been mentioned as well.  In his contribution 
to a symposium on Austin held in 1965 and first published in its entirety in 
1969, Quine acknowledges that Austin’s discussion of explicit performatives 
utterances in How to Do Things with Words was directed against what Austin 
there calls –identifying it as one of the principal targets of his work– the 
“true/false fetish” (Austin 1975: 151), but claims that explicit performative 
utterances do not justify “Austin’s animus against the true/false fetish”, 
since what is special about an explicit performative utterance –in Quine’s 
view– is not, as Austin thought, that it lacks a truth condition, but rather 
that its truth condition is such that it can be satisfied by the utterance’s own 
issuance, thus rendering the utterance one that is true:  
 
“I bid you good morning” is true of us on a given occasion if and 
only if, on that occasion, I bid you good morning. A performative is a 
notable sort of statement, I grant; it makes itself true; but then it is 
true. (Quine in Urmson, Quine and Hampshire 1969: 90) 
 
Variously embellished, the view that Quine here expresses underlies almost 
all post-Austinian accounts of explicit performatives, including the two 
currently most popular (and otherwise antagonistic) ones, due respectively 
to Kent Bach (1975) and to John Searle (1989).  According to Bach, explicit 
performative utterances are “statements” that “are true in virtue of being 
made” (Bach 1975: 230); and according to Searle, “performative utterances 
are those in which saying something makes it true” (Searle 1998b: 115). 
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 I will call the kind of view just outlined “the anti-Austinian view”, and 
it will be the object of critical attention in what follows. It should be noted 
that although all proponents of the anti-Austinian view agree that explicit 
performative utterances are truth evaluable utterances of declarative 
sentences whose truth conditions are such that they can be satisfied, thus 
making the utterances true,  by the utterances’ own issuance, they need not 
agree, and in fact they rarely do agree, on the question as to why explicit 
performatives utterances happen to have (whereas truth-evaluable 
utterances of other types of declarative sentences happen not to have) truth 
conditions of that special kind.  Since examining, on a case by case basis, the 
conflicting answers to that question given by various anti-Austinians would 
be relevant only if one had no doubt about the correctness of the basic anti-
Austinian claim to which they all subscribe, and since it is the correctness of 
that basic claim that I doubt, I will have nothing further to say about 
internal disputes within the anti-Austinian camp in this essay.       
 
Against the anti-Austinian view, Part I 
Suppose, as the anti-Austinian view has it, that the explicit performativity of 
an utterance (that is, the fact that it can constitute the act that it names) is 
due to its having a truth condition that is such that it can be satisfied, thus 
making the utterance true, by the utterance’s issuance. It follows from this 
that any utterance that has the same truth condition as the truth condition that, 
by hypothesis, a given explicit performative utterance has will also be 
capable of constituting, through its issuance, the act that it names: if the 
capacity of an utterance to be used performatively is correctly explicable as 
resulting from its truth-condition’s being such as to be satisfiable by the 
utterance’s issuance, then issuances of any utterances that share an explicit 
performative’s supposed truth condition should also share its capacity to be 
used performatively.   
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Call this consequence of the anti-Austinian view Thesis T. Among 
the ways of seeing that Thesis T is false, and that, therefore, the anti-
Austinian view cannot be right, a simple one consists in assuming the 
nowadays standard, Kaplanian, view of the interpretation of indexicals, and 
in considering the effect of replacing, in certain contexts, the first-personal 
indexical subject term of an explicit performative utterance with a co-
referential second-personal indexical subject term. The relevant part of the 
standard view of the interpretation of indexicals is simply the thesis that 
singular indexicals are directly referential expressions, and can be expressed 
as follows: given a declarative sentence containing a singular indexical, the 
indexical’s contribution to the truth condition that, relative to a context of 
use, the declarative sentence has is just the referent of the indexical in that 
context of use, rather than any ‘way of presenting’ or any ‘way of fixing’ that 
referent in that context of use (notice that the standard view does not deny 
that different ‘ways of presenting’ or different ‘ways of fixing’ their referents 
may be associated with distinct singular indexicals as parts of their distinct 
linguistic meanings; what it asserts is that it is only their referents, and not 
those ‘ways of presenting’ or ‘ways of fixing’ their referents, that the 
indexicals contribute to the context-relative truth conditions of the sentences 
where they occur; cf. Kaplan 1989a,b).  It follows from this that if the only 
difference between two truth-evaluable declarative sentences is that they 
contain distinct singular indexicals that are co-referential relative to a 
context of use, then the two sentences have exactly the same truth condition 
relative to that context of use.  For example, relative to a context in which 
John produces a token of (1a) while Maria, addressing John, produces a 
token of (1b),   
 
(1a) I am Italian. 
(1b) You are Italian. 
 13
 
(1a) and (1b) have exactly the same truth condition, namely the condition 
that John is Italian; and relative to a context in which Maria produces a 
token of (1a) while John, addressing Maria, produces a token of (1b), (1a) 
and (1b) have exactly the same truth condition, namely the condition that 
Maria is Italian.    
But now, if the standard view of the interpretation of indexicals is 
taken to apply to explicit performative utterances, as it must be taken to 
apply if explicit performatives are assumed to be truth-evaluable, then the 
anti-Austinian view is constrained to derive the obviously false conclusion 
that a host of utterances that are clearly incapable of being explicit 
performatives ones are in fact capable of being explicit performatives ones, 
since those utterances will have exactly the same truth conditions as the 
explicit performative ones,  and so their issuance will be capable of 
satisfying those conditions just as much as the issuance of the explicit 
performative ones does.  Consider a context in which John produces a 
token of (2a) while Maria, addressing John, produces a token of (2b), and in 
which the present tense markers of both John’s and Maria’s tokens have the 
same present time reference:  
 
(2a) I deny that arithmetic is complete. 
(2b) You deny that arithmetic is complete. 
 
Assume –as it can certainly be the case– that John’s token is an explicit 
performative one (that is, in producing it, John accomplishes the act, which 
he names, of denying that arithmetic is complete). Then, given the standard 
view of the interpretation of indexicals, the anti-Austinian view entails the 
obvious falsehood that not only John’s but also Maria’s token can constitute 
John’s denial that arithmetic is complete.   For, on the assumption that John’s 
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explicit performative token is truth-evaluable, the standard view of the 
interpretation of indexicals will entail that John’s and Maria’s tokens have 
exactly the same truth condition –namely, the condition that John denies that 
arithmetic is complete.   And on the further assumption  that a token’s 
explicit performativity is due to its having a truth condition that is such that 
it can be satisfied by the token’s issuance,   it will follow that the issuance of 
either one of the two tokens  can satisfy their identical truth condition, and 
can thus be an explicit performative token –it will follow, in other words,  
not only that John’s token of (2a) can constitute his denial that arithmetic is 
complete,  but also that Maria’s token of (2b) can constitute John’s denial 
that arithmetic is complete. Since, however, it is obvious that, although 
John’s token of (2a) can constitute John’s denial that arithmetic is complete, 
Maria’s token of (2b) cannot constitute John’s (or, for that matter, anyone 
else’s) denial that arithmetic is complete, the conclusion must be that the 
anti-Austinian view cannot explain the explicit performativity of (2a) 
without falsely attributing explicit performativity to (2b).   
This point is obviously generalizable to indefinitely many cases, 
indicating that the explanatory failure of the anti-Austinian view that it 
signals is a failure on a massive scale. Take any pair of utterances of present 
tense declarative sentences of the forms “I Φ” and  “You Φ”, naming an 
illocutionary act of Φ-ing, of which the first can be an explicit performative 
utterance (that is, can constitute the act of Φ-ing that it names) while the 
second cannot be an explicit performative utterance (that is, cannot 
constitute the act of Φ-ing that it names), and in which the present tense 
forms have the same present time reference and the first- and second-
person singular indexicals are co-referential. Then, on the anti-Austinian 
assumption that the utterance of the form “I Φ” is truth-evaluable, the 
standard view of the interpretation of indexicals will entail that “I Φ” and 
“You Φ” have exactly the same truth condition. And this, together with the 
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further anti-Austinian assumption that the performativity of an utterance is 
due to its having a truth condition that is such that it can be satisfied by the 
utterance’s issuance, will entail the obvious falsehood that “You Φ” can be 
an explicit performative utterance just as much as “I Φ” can –in other 
words, will entail that the issuance of “You Φ” can constitute the act of Φ-
ing that it names just as much as the issuance of “I Φ” can constitute the act 
of Φ-ing that it names. 
 In order to avoid this explanatory collapse while remaining true to his 
or her anti-Austinianism, the anti-Austinian would have to defend the 
extraordinary claim that an explicit performative utterance of the form “I 
Φ”, even though it is, by anti-Austinian lights, truth-evaluable, cannot have 
the same truth condition as a corresponding non-performative utterance of 
the form “You Φ”,  when the present tense forms of both utterances have 
the same present time reference, and their first- and second-person 
indexicals are co-referential.  But it is very hard to see how this claim could 
be credibly defended, since its defence would require revisionary 
assumptions, which hardly anyone would be willing to accept, about either 
the interpretation of indexical expressions or the interpretation of 
performative verbs.  If the claim’s defence were meant to rely on a 
revisionary assumption about the interpretation of indexical expressions 
(rather than of performative verbs), the claim would be rejected, since the 
requisite assumption would have to be nothing less than the assumption that 
it is impossible for the members of a set of truth-evaluable declarative 
sentences to have the same truth condition, relative to a context of use, 
when those members differ only in that they contain distinct singular 
indexicals that are co-referential relative to that context of use.  But taking 
this to be impossible entails denying that, for example, “I am fifty years 
old”, said by me to you today, can have the same truth condition as “You 
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are fifty years old,” said by you to me today.  And any theory of indexicality 
that is constrained to deny that would most likely be rejected.  
If, on the other hand, the defence of the anti-Austinian claim were to 
rely on a revisionary assumption about the interpretation of performative 
verbs (rather than of indexical expressions),  then it would be rejected too,  
since the requisite assumption about the interpretation of performative 
verbs would have to be that every apparently unambiguous performative 
verb is ambiguous between at least two necessarily divergent senses, in the 
first of which the verb has only first-person present-tense occurrences and in 
the second of which it has only non-first-person non-present-tense 
occurrences (on that account, that is, the reason why, for example,  “I deny 
that arithmetic is complete”, said by me to you, and “You deny that 
arithmetic is complete”, said by you to me, would, allegedly, have necessarily 
disjoint truth conditions would be that the verb ‘deny’, as used in the first 
utterance, is not the same verb as, and has necessarily a different meaning 
from,  the verb ‘deny’ as used in the second utterance). But the assumption 
that every apparently unambiguous performative verb is ambiguous in this 
highly peculiar way, besides being one that every anti-Austinian is on record 
as emphatically denying, is one that would entail that explicit performative 
utterances, as normally understood, do not exist at all, and would, if only for 
that reason, be rejected.  For, on the normal understanding of 
performativity, an explicit performative utterance of the form “I Φ” is, 
among other things, one whose issuance by a speaker would have satisfied 
an imperative utterance of the form “Φ!” that would have been addressed to 
that speaker (if you were to address to me the imperative “Promise never to 
lie again!”, my utterance of the performative “I promise never to lie again” 
would have satisfied your imperative; if you were to address to me the 
imperative “Admit that you are guilty!”, my utterance of the performative “I 
admit that I am guilty” would have satisfied your imperative; and so on).  
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On the assumption under consideration, however, no explicit performative 
of the form “I Φ” could ever satisfy a corresponding imperative of the form 
“Φ!”,  since, despite all appearances, the act that the utterer of the 
performative would be naming and performing would, of necessity, not be 
the act whose performance the utterer of the imperative would have 
solicited. And this is surely a consequence that no account of performatives 
(or, for that matter, of imperatives) would tolerate.  
Since the anti-Austinian has no credible way of avoiding the 
explanatory collapse engendered by the falsity of Thesis T, the claim from 
which Thesis T follows –namely, that the explicit performativity of an 
utterance is due to its having a truth condition that is such that it can be 
satisfied by the utterance’s issuance– must me rejected.  And there are, of 
course, many other types of case that lead to the same kind of explanatory 
collapse.  One type of case that is particularly striking (and indicates that 
trying to make the anti-Austinian explanation more restrictive would not 
remove its explanatory impotence) becomes apparent if one considers the 
effect of replacing, in certain kinds of context, the indexical subject term of 
an explicit performative utterance with a co-referential proper name, and if 
one assumes (as it is very widely assumed) that, at least in that sort of 
syntactic position, proper names are as much directly referential expressions 
as indexicals are (that is, contribute only their referents to the truth 
conditions of the sentences containing them).  Suppose that Steven Stevens 
is amnesiac about his name, and that, fully believing that he is someone other 
than Steven Stevens, he makes what he takes to be a conjecture about 
Stevens’s current deeds by saying, 
 
(3a) Steven Stevens denies/bets/concludes that there is life in other 
planets. 
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It is clear that Stevens would not have thereby denied/bet/concluded 
(unbeknownst to himself, as it were) that there is life in other planets. On 
the other hand, if the amnesiac Stevens were to say instead, 
 
(3b) I deny/bet/conclude that there is life in other planets. 
 
he would have thereby denied/bet/concluded that there is life in other 
planets.  The anti-Austinian view, however, cannot acknowledge the explicit 
performativity of (3b) without falsely attributing explicit performativity to 
(3a). For since, if both (3a) and (3b) were truth-evaluable, they would, in the 
circumstances, have exactly the same truth condition, the anti-Austinian 
view would wrongly entail that the issuance of (3a) could constitute the act 
of denying/betting/submitting that it names just as much as the issuance of 
(3b) could.   
Indeed, it is not even necessary to invoke atypical conditions like a 
speaker’s ignorance of his or her own name in order to produce cases with 
just this effect.  Far from atypical conditions like an addressee’s ignorance of a 
speaker’s name would do as well. Suppose that I am Philip Philips and know 
full well what my name is, but that you don’t know what my name is, and I 
am fully aware of the fact that you don’t know what my name is.  If, in these 
circumstances, I were to say to you,   
 
(4a)  I condemn/applaud your actions. 
 
I would have thereby condemned/applauded your actions.  But if, in the 
same circumstances, I were to say to you, 
 
(4b) Philip Philips condemns/applauds your actions. 
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I would not have thereby condemned/applauded your actions, no matter 
what I might be ‘privately’ taking myself to be doing. However, if both (4a) 
and (4b) were truth evaluable, then, relative to a context in which they 
would be uttered by me and addressed to you, they would have exactly the 
same truth condition; and this, given the anti-Austinian explanation of 
performativity, would lead to the obviously false conclusion that my 
utterance of (4b) could constitute my act of condemning/applauding your 
actions just as much as my utterance of (4a) could.  
 It is important to bear in mind, in considering all these  
counterexamples, that the anti-Austinian explanation of performativity is 
best viewed as purporting to enable an abductive argument in favor of the 
anti-Austinian thesis that performatives are truth-evaluable: It is not as if the 
anti-Austinian thesis were somehow obviously true, and should be accepted 
whether or not it led to an adequate explanation of the phenomenon of 
performativity;  rather, its leading to an adequate explanation of the 
phenomenon of performativity would provide the principal reason for 
thinking that it is true;  consequently, its not leading to such an adequate 
explanation removes the principal reason for taking it to be true,  and thus 
for undermining Austin’s thesis.  Indeed,  viewed from such an abductive 
perspective, Austin’s contrary thesis that explicit performatives are truth-
valueless might now appear to offer the simplest explanation of the fact, 
revealed in the above discussion of the counterexamples, that certain non-
first-personal utterances that should behave exactly as explicit performatives 
utterances do, if the latter were truth-evaluable in the way the anti-Austinian 
view supposes, do not so behave: they do not so behave, the Austinian 
would hold, because they are truth-evaluable utterances, whereas explicit 
performatives aren’t. 
 
Against the anti-Austinian view, Part II 
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The argument of the previous section was that anti-Austinian explanations 
of performativity cannot be correct since there exist utterances that, on 
those explanations, should be capable of being used performatively, but 
nevertheless turn out to be incapable of being used performatively. The 
argument of the present section will be that anti-Austinian explanations 
cannot be correct for the complementary reason that there exist utterances 
that, on those explanations, should be incapable of being used 
performatively, but nevertheless turn out to be capable of being used 
performatively.   
Suppose again, as the anti-Austinian view proposes, that the explicit 
performativity of an utterance (that is, the fact that it can constitute the act 
that it names) is due to the fact that its truth condition is such that it can be 
satisfied, thus making the utterance true, by the utterance’s own issuance. 
From this it follows that nothing could be an explicit performative utterance 
if, considered as something truth-evaluable, it would entail something that 
happens to be false. For, if something that is truth-evaluable entails 
something that happens to be false, it cannot itself be true. And if 
something cannot be true, it cannot be true by virtue of being issued. So, if 
an explicit performative utterance is something truth-evaluable that is true 
by virtue of being issued, then nothing can be an explicit performative 
utterance if, considered as something truth-evaluable, it entails something 
that happens to be false. 
Let us call this consequence of the anti-Austinian view Thesis F.  
There are several types of counterexample showing that Thesis F is false, 
and that, therefore, the anti-Austinian view cannot be correct, but I shall 
here concentrate on a particular type of case, which is connected to the 
important topic of the role of the concepts of sincerity and insincerity in 
accounts of linguistic action. Consider the following utterances,   
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(5)  I sincerely assert that I haven’t been here before.  
(6)  I sincerely wish you a speedy recovery.  
(7)  I sincerely apologize for my last remark. 
(8)  I sincerely promise to pay all my debts to you. 
 
concerning which the following statements indisputably hold: First, each 
one of them can constitute, by virtue of being issued, the act (of asserting, 
of giving one’s wish, of apologizing, and of promising, respectively) named 
by its first-person present-tense main verb –in other words, each one of 
them can be an explicit performative utterance. Second, each one of them 
can constitute the act named by its first-person present-tense main verb (and 
so, can be an explicit performative utterance) even when its utterer does not satisfy 
the characteristic sincerity expectation associated with performances of the act in 
question –that is, even when its utterer does not believe what he asserts (in 
the case where the act he names and performs is an assertion), does not 
desire or hope what he is giving his wish for (in the case where the act he 
names and performs is the act of giving his wish), does not feel regret over 
what he apologizes about (in the case where the act he names and performs 
is an apology), and does not intend to do what he promises to do (in the 
case where the act he names and performs is a promise). Thus, I can 
successfully assert, in uttering (5), that I haven’t been at the place of my 
utterance at a time prior to the time of my utterance, even though I do not 
believe that this was the case, and indeed even if I know that it was not the 
case (I may simply, in making my assertion, be lying to a police officer who 
is conducting a murder investigation); similarly, I can successfully, in 
uttering (6), give you my wish for your speedy recovery, even though I don’t 
really want you to recover soon, and indeed even if I secretly hope that you 
will not recover soon;  again, I can apologize, in uttering (7), for a previous 
remark of mine, even though, far from feeling the slightest regret about 
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having made it, I am secretly delighted about having made it, noticing that it 
has had the damaging effect that I had intended; and of course, I can 
promise, in uttering (8), to pay all my debts to you, even though I do not 
have the intention of paying any of my debts to you, but am simply trying to 
gain time in order to better organize my disappearance.  
The phenomenon that these cases exemplify is perfectly general, and 
it is one that no adequate account of linguistic action should fail to 
recognize: for any illocutionary act that generates a characteristic sincerity 
expectation (in the case of assertions,  the expectation that the speaker 
believes what she asserts; in the case of apologies, the expectation that the 
speaker regrets what she apologizes about; in the case of promises, the 
expectation that the speaker intends to realize what she promises; and so 
on),  a speaker can successfully perform the illocutionary act –by, among 
others, explicit performative means, when such are available– without 
satisfying its associated sincerity expectation.  And, of course, serious 
attempts at constructing theories of illocutionary acts routinely recognize, 
under various terminologies, this fact. For example, Searle and 
Vanderveken, who call the characteristic sincerity expectation generated by 
an illocutionary act the “sincerity condition” on that act, rely, in their 
Foundations of Illocutionary Logic, on a fundamental distinction between, on the 
one hand, “success conditions” on illocutionary acts (that is, conditions 
whose non-satisfaction entails the non-performance of the acts) and, on the 
other hand, “non-defectiveness conditions” on illocutionary acts (that is, 
conditions whose non-satisfaction does not entail the non-performance of 
the acts),  and  clearly acknowledge that all so-called “sincerity conditions” 
on illocutionary acts are merely conditions on illocutionary non-
defectiveness and not conditions on illocutionary success (Searle and 
Vanderveken 1985: Chapter 1). And although Searle and Vanderveken 
misleadingly suggest (Searle and Vanderveken 1985: 13) that Austin “fails” 
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to draw such a distinction, the truth is that Austin makes an exactly parallel 
distinction, and an exactly parallel acknowledgment, in his long discussion, 
in How to Do Things with Words (Austin 1975: Lectures II–IV), of the 
conditions under which an explicit performative utterance naming an 
illocutionary act may be, in his terms, “infelicitous” with respect to the 
performance of the act that it names.  For, Austin there sharply 
distinguishes between two fundamental types of such conditions (and, 
correspondingly, two fundamental types of “infelicity”): on the one hand, 
those whose non-satisfaction (called by him a “misfire”) entails the non-
performance of the act named by the performative verb, and, on the other 
hand, those whose non-satisfaction (called by him an “abuse”) does not 
entail the non-performance of the act named by the performative verb; and 
he explicitly assigns all conditions having to do with characteristic sincerity 
expectations associated with performatively usable illocutionary verbs (these 
are the conditions belonging to sub-class “Γ.1.” in his classification of 
felicity conditions) to the category of conditions whose non-satisfaction 
would merely constitute an illocutionary “abuse” and not an illocutionary 
“misfire”.  
But although it is evidently true, and widely recognized, that an 
illocutionary act denoted by a performative verb can be accomplished even 
when its agent does not satisfy the characteristic sincerity expectation 
associated with that act, the implications that this phenomenon has on the 
analysis of utterances such (5)-(8) have not been investigated, and are 
especially significant in the present context.  For, speakers of these 
utterances not only can accomplish the acts they name without satisfying 
their associated sincerity expectations; they can accomplish them in that way 
in spite of the fact that they present themselves as satisfying those expectations.  
And this means that, considered as truth-evaluable utterances, these utterances 
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could not fail to be false when they thus accomplish the acts they name and 
accomplish.  
The key fact to notice in order to appreciate this point is that, 
although the bare statement that an agent performs a certain illocutionary 
act does not entail (as just noted) that the agent satisfies the sincerity 
expectation associated with that act, the statement than an agent sincerely 
performs a certain illocutionary act does entail that the agent satisfies the 
sincerity expectation associated with that act –that is why, for example, 
third-person statements like (9)-(12) are not contradictory, whereas 
corresponding third-person statements like (13)-(16) are contradictory: 
 
(9) He asserted that he hadn’t been there before, even though he didn’t 
believe that this was the case, and indeed knew that it wasn’t the case.   
(10) He wished her a speedy recovery without really wanting her to recover.  
(11) He apologized for his remarks, even though he never felt regret about 
those remarks.  
(12) He promised to pay all his debts to her, without having the slightest 
intention of paying any of his debts to her.  
 
(13) He sincerely asserted that he hadn’t been there before, even though he 
didn’t believe that this was the case, and indeed knew that it wasn’t the case.   
(14) He sincerely wished her a speedy recovery without really wanting her to 
recover.  
(15) He sincerely apologized for his remarks, even though he never felt 
regret about those remarks.  
(16) He sincerely promised to pay all his debts to her, without having the 
slightest intention of paying any of his debts to her.  
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Once this point is appreciated, however, it is not difficult to see that the 
undeniable fact that speakers of explicit performative utterances such as (5)-
(8) can be performing the illocutionary acts they name without satisfying the 
sincerity expectations that they therein present themselves as satisfying is simply 
inconsistent with the anti-Austinian explanation of performativity. Suppose 
that, anxious to avoid the possibility of being enlisted as a murder suspect, I 
produce, responding to a relevant inquiry by a police officer, the following 
utterance: 
 
(5)  I sincerely assert that I haven’t been here before.  
 
My utterance of (5) would certainly constitute the assertion that it names –
namely, the assertion that I haven’t been at the place of my utterance at a 
time prior to the time of my utterance–, even though I might not, while 
uttering it, believe that I haven’t been at the place of my utterance at a time 
prior to the time of my utterance, and might even know that I have 
frequently been there in the past.  (Notice that if the police officer later 
discovers that I have frequently been there in the past, he could rightly 
accuse me of having asserted, falsely, that I have not been there in the past; 
and that I could hardly defend myself against that accusation by claiming 
that, since I never believed that I hadn’t been there in the past, I have not 
made that assertion at all, and so cannot have made it falsely.)  On the anti-
Austinian account, however, if I were to utter (5) without believing that I 
haven’t been at the place of my utterance at a time prior to the time of my 
utterance, I could not thereby be asserting that I haven’t been at the place of 
my utterance at a time prior to the time of my utterance, and my utterance 
of (5) could not have been an explicit performative utterance. For, on the anti-
Austinian view, an explicit performative utterance is a truth-evaluable 
utterance that is rendered true by being issued.  Considered as a truth-
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evaluable utterance, however, my utterance of (5) would, in the envisaged 
circumstances, be certainly false, since what it would entail –namely, that I 
believe that I haven’t been at the place of my utterance at a time prior to the 
time of my utterance– would itself be false. And since an utterance that is 
false cannot at the same time be true, let alone true in virtue of being issued, 
my utterance of (5) would wrongly be taken, on the anti-Austinian view, to 
be an utterance that could not possibly be an explicit performative 
utterance. 
 For exactly analogous reasons, the anti-Austinian view makes 
obviously incorrect predictions about a host of relevantly similar cases. For 
example, in uttering (6), (7) and (8), 
 
(6) I sincerely wish you a speedy recovery. 
(7) I sincerely apologize for my last remark. 
(8) I sincerely promise to pay all my debts to you. 
 
I may, respectively, be giving you my wish for your speedy recovery without 
really wanting you to recover, be apologizing for a previous remark of mine 
without really regretting that remark, and be promising to pay my debts to you 
without in the least intending to pay my debts to you. On the anti-Austinian 
view, however, none of these things could possibly happen;  for,   (6), (7) 
and (8) cannot, on that view, be used for performing the illocutionary acts 
they name unless they are truth-evaluable utterances that are rendered true 
by being issued; and, since, considered as truth-evaluable utterances,  (6), (7) 
and (8) would, in the envisaged circumstances, be false rather than true –
given that what they would respectively entail about my desires, my regrets, 
and my intentions would be false– it would follow, contrary to fact, that (6), 
(7) and (8) could not possibly be, respectively, my wish for your speedy 
recovery, my apology for my remark to you, and my promise to pay my 
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debts to you. Indeed, there is literally no end to the wrong predictions that 
the anti-Austinian view would commit its adherent to in this area: For any 
illocutionary act that is associated with a characteristic sincerity expectation, 
and that a speaker performs through an explicit performative utterance in 
which he or she purports to be satisfying the act’s associated sincerity 
expectation without in fact satisfying it, the anti-Austinian view will wrongly 
entail that the illocutionary act itself is not performed at all, and hence that 
what is in fact an explicit performative utterance is not an explicit 
performative utterance.  
 There is exactly one way in which the anti-Austinian might try to 
remain anti-Austinian in view of this new explanatory impasse, but I don’t 
believe that anyone, including the anti-Austinian, would, on reflection, be 
willing to employ it: It would consist in stipulating that nothing is to count 
as an illocutionary act unless its associated sincerity expectation is in fact 
satisfied (thus, no one is to count as asserting something unless one believes 
what one asserts, no one is to count as apologizing for something unless one 
feels regret over what one apologizes about, no one is to count as promising 
something unless one intends to do what one promises to do, and so on).  
The problem with this stipulation, of course, is that it would oblige the anti-
Austinian to define out of existence a great many things that without any 
doubt exist –for example, lies.  Suppose that you are suspected of having 
committed a crime, and that, in response to a relevant inquiry, you defend 
yourself by saying: 
 
(17) I sincerely assert that I am innocent. 
 
Everyone would agree that, in saying this, (a) you would be asserting that you 
are innocent, and (b) you might be lying about your innocence. According to 
the stipulation under consideration, however, that would be quite 
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impossible: if your utterance is an assertion that you are innocent, then it 
cannot be a lie about your innocence, since assertions that can be lies simply 
do not exist.  This is the sort of consequence that, I suppose, would force 
everyone, including the anti-Austinian, to reject the stipulation under 
consideration as a defensible way of saving the anti-Austinian view from its 
new explanatory impasse.  And since no other decent way appears to be 
available, no salvation appears to be forthcoming. 
 Since what causes this explanatory impasse is the falsity of Thesis F, 
the claim from which that thesis follows –namely, that an explicit 
performative utterance is a truth-evaluable utterance that is rendered true by 
virtue of being issued– must be rejected.  And if that claim is rejected, it can 
of course provide no motivation whatsoever for the anti-Austinian view that 
explicit performative are truth-evaluable.  On the contrary, it is the 
Austinian view that performatives are not truth-evaluable that, if accepted, 
would help one understand why there has been an impasse here in the first 
place: if explicit performatives are not truth-evaluable, then they do not 
literally have entailments, and so the question of what happens to ‘their’ truth 
values when ‘their’ entailments turn out to be false does not even begin to 
make sense.  
  
Against the anti-Austinian view, Part III 
I will now give an independent argument in favour of the Austinian claim, 
which, if correct, undermines the anti-Austinian view at an even earlier 
juncture than the previous ones, since it focuses simply on the thesis that 
explicit performatives are truth evaluable utterances rather than on the more 
specific thesis that they are truth evaluable utterances that are rendered true 
by being issued. The argument is based on the simple idea that if explicit 
performative utterances were truth-evaluable, they should be able, while 
retaining their performativity, to participate as premises in deductive 
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arguments that would be recognized as instances of valid argument forms. 
For, since recognizing such an argument as an instance of such a form 
requires only that its premises be recognized as truth evaluable, rather than 
as true, nothing more –and, of course, nothing less– than its truth-
evaluability would be required of any explicit performative utterance in 
order for it to be able to participate as a premise in a deductive argument 
that would be recognized as an instance of a valid argument form.  So, an 
explicit performative’s inability to participate as a premise in an argument of 
that kind would constitute evidence that its performativity is incompatible 
with its truth-evaluability.    
That performativity and truth-evaluability are indeed incompatible for 
this reason can be seen by considering (among many other similar cases) the 
sharp contrast in perceived validity between the ‘argument’ in (18*) and the 
argument in (18), 
 
(18*) If you don’t have a gun, I don’t guarantee your safety. 
          I guarantee your safety. 
          Therefore, you have a gun. 
 
(18)  If she didn’t have a gun, he didn’t guarantee her safety. 
He guaranteed her safety. 
Therefore, she had a gun. 
 
or the equally sharp contrast in perceived validity between the ‘argument’ in 
(19*) and the argument in (19): 
 
(19*) If you don’t like pepper, I don’t recommend to you the poulet au poivre. 
         I recommend to you the poulet au poivre. 
         Therefore, you like pepper.  
 
(19) If she didn’t like pepper, he didn’t recommend to her the poulet au poivre. 
       He did recommend to her the poulet au poivre. 
       Therefore, she did like pepper.  
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No one, I suppose, would claim that the ‘arguments’ in (18*) and (19*) are 
in any sense valid arguments if their respective second premises are read as 
explicit performative utterances (that is, if the second premise of (18*) is 
read as being the guarantee that it names, and the second premise of (19*) is 
read as being the recommendation that it names).  On the other hand, 
everyone would accept that the arguments in (18) and (19), where the 
second premises cannot be read as explicit performative utterances, are 
classically valid arguments.  But these sharply contrasting judgments about 
validity cannot be squared with the hypothesis that the second premises of 
(18*) and (19*) are truth-evaluable when they are read as explicit performative 
utterances.  For, if the second premises of (18*) and (19*) were truth-
evaluable when read as explicit performative utterances, it would be arbitrary 
in the extreme, and disrespectful of every compositionality requirement, not 
to formalize (18*) and (19*) as instances of the same argument schema that 
the formalizations of (18) and (19) would be instances of.   And since that 
schema is classically valid, one would be forced by classical logic to take the 
patently invalid ‘arguments’ in (18*) and (19*) to be exactly on a par, in 
respect of their validity, with the clearly valid ones in (18) and (19).  As a 
result, the only way to reconcile the parallel formalizations with the sharply 
contrasting judgments about validity would be to reject classical logic –in 
particular, to deny that modus tollens is an unrestrictedly reliable inference 
rule.   
And, of course, if modus tollens were to be given up on such grounds, it 
should not be surprising that modus ponens would have to be given up as well. 
No one, presumably, would accept that the ‘argument’ in (20*) below is a 
valid argument, if its second premise is read as an explicit performative 
utterance (that is, if its second premise is read as constituting the request that it 
names): 
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(20*)  If I ask you to have dinner with me, you pretend you are busy. 
I ask you to have dinner with me. 
Therefore, you pretend you are busy. 
 
On the other hand, everyone would accept that the argument in (20), where 
the second premise cannot be read as an explicit performative utterance, is a 
classically valid argument: 
 
(20)  If he asks me to have dinner with him, I pretend I am busy. 
He asks me to have dinner with him. 
Therefore, I pretend I am busy. 
 
But this sharp contrast in perceived validity cannot be squared with the 
hypothesis that the second premise of (20*) is truth evaluable when read as an 
explicit performative utterance; for, if the second premise of (20*) were truth 
evaluable when so read, it would be compositionally irresponsible not to  
formalize (20*) as an instance of the same argument schema that the 
formalization of (20) would be an instance of;  and since that schema is 
classically valid,  one would be forced by classical logic to conclude that the 
obviously invalid ‘argument’ in (20*) is exactly on a par, in respect of its 
validity,  with the obviously valid one in (20). Consequently, the only way to 
reconcile the parallel formalizations with the sharp contrast in perceived 
validity would again be to reject classical logic, concluding this time that 
modus ponens, no less than modus tollens, is an unreliable inference rule.  
 But rejecting classical logic would be quite an exorbitant price to pay 
in order to save the hypothesis that explicit performatives are truth-
evaluable. And I am reasonably confident that those who have been 
attracted by that hypothesis would be quite unwilling to pay that price, and 
not pleasantly surprised to learn that the defence of their hypothesis would 
require them to become wanton logical revisionists. I therefore conclude 
that it would be in their best interests to reject that hypothesis and to accept 
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that explicit performatives are not truth evaluable, just as Austin, without 
offering arguments, has been urging.   
 
Conclusion 
Austin, as I mentioned in the beginning, claimed that his thesis that explicit 
performatives are not true or false is too obviously true to require argument: 
“It needs argument”, he wrote (1975: 6), “no more than that ‘damn’ is not 
true or false.” It is clear in hindsight that, in making that claim, Austin was 
greatly overestimating the degree to which subsequent philosophers would 
be prepared to accept without argument the view that explicit performatives 
are truth-valueless.  I have tried to show, however, that Austin’s opponents 
can be given some good reasons for accepting that view, and that their best 
argument for not accepting it (namely, that by rejecting it they could explain 
how explicit performatives manage to accomplish the acts they name) turns 
out to be fatally flawed.  If I am right, it is perhaps time to start suspecting 
that Austin’s opponents may have been just too hasty in supposing that they 
have successfully neutralized the serious threat that explicit performatives 
pose to the bundle of prejudices that Austin was referring to as “the 
descriptive fallacy”. 
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